On asymmetric causal relationships in petropolitics

dc.contributor.authorBalan, Feyza
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-27T18:59:01Z
dc.date.available2025-01-27T18:59:01Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.departmentÇanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi
dc.description.abstractThe aim of this paper is to examine whether the First Law of Petropolitics denominated by Friedman in 2006 is valid for OPEC countries. To do this, this paper analyses the relationship between political risk and oil supply by applying the asymmetric panel causality test suggested by Hatemi-J (2011) to these countries for the period 1984-2014. The results show that the First Law of Petropolitics is valid for Angola, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, given that positive oil supply shocks significantly lead to negative political stability shocks, and negative oil supply shocks significantly lead to positive shocks in political stability.
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/EKA1609007B
dc.identifier.endpage25
dc.identifier.issn0013-3264
dc.identifier.issue209
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84981283830
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3
dc.identifier.startpage7
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.2298/EKA1609007B
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12428/13120
dc.identifier.volume61
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Belgrade
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Annals
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20250125
dc.subjectAsymmetric panel causality test; Oil prices; OPEC; Political risk
dc.titleOn asymmetric causal relationships in petropolitics
dc.typeArticle

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