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Öğe Claims of Massacre and Persecution Attributed to Khurasan Governor Qutayba Ibn Muslim al-Bahili(Cumhuriyet Univ, Fac Theology, 2018) Akyurek, YunusQutayba ibn Muslim al-Bahili is one of the leading soldier-bureaucrats of the Umayyads period. During the time he served as the governor of Khurasan, he consolidated the Umayyad's rule in Tokharistan and Transoxiana provinces, and expanded the borders of the state to China by conquering the Kashgar region. His activities for conversion of the people of the conquered regions have great importance in the history of Islam since the intense relations of the Turkish people with Islam fell upon the time of his governorship. It is possible to argue that by introducing the religion to these people Qutayba had played an important role in their conversion to Islam. It is also known that he had sent a delegation to the emperor of China for the same purpose. However, despite all his achievements, it is seen that the academic studies about Qutayba in our country are very rare. Besides, some of the recent studies about him claim that he was a fraud, a trickster, and an untrustworthy person in his military activities; and had committed mass murders and massacres, persecuted innocent people, destroyed and burned the cities of conquered lands. In this article, it is examined that whether these claims and accusations have their justifications or not by consulting the main sources. In fact, what is expected from constructive criticism in this subject and every other area is to clarify the matter and make it more comprehensible of its context. However, it should not be forgotten that some conclusions over Qutayba in these studies might have been drawn to quickly in order to manipulate the conquest movements of the Umayyad period.Öğe Hilf Fact During Jahiliyyah Period in Quraysh Community(Sakarya Univ, 2018) Akyurek, YunusHumans are social beings. The norms of law that determine the basic rules of living together are as old as human history. In the context, it is possible to come upon various practices of law that originates from different needs, starting from primitive tribes to the Arab society of the Jahiliyyah period and to the Quraysh tribe which is the prototype of this society. The law practiced by the Arabs in general and by the Quraysh in particular can be put forward only with extensive studies when it comes to its specific aspects and original dimensions, and whether there are any influences of neighbouring states and civilizations on its structure and similar unknowns about it. Nevertheless, a study on the hilf practice which the Arab tribes and especially the Quraysh often practiced will be helpful to form an opinion on the Jahiliyyah law. It seems that there is an angle of consistency within the Jahiliyyah law itself. However, in a region where there exists no political organization at the state level, it is understood that the law was formed by the powerful and accommodated their world view and interests and thus became the law of certain people and groups rather than the whole society.Öğe Jizya Tax Levied on Mawali By Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf's Period in Umayyads and Its Background(Cumhuriyet Univ, Fac Theology, 2019) Akyurek, YunusThe Umayyad State is widely criticized in the West as well as in its own region. Actually, this is normal situation. Because Hijaz Arabs who had no state experience, built a multinational state in short period of time. Yet, this caused serious matters. The fundamental point of the criticism is the payment of tax, also called jizya, which is taken from residents (mawal1) of Khorasan and Transoxania. However, in most studies on this subject, it is understood that the jizya taken from ma walfis combined jizya and kharja, which is different type of tax. Although ma walfwas tested for whether it passes religious criteria in critic periods or not, this situation did not last throughout the entire Umayyad history. It was continued for fifteen and twenty years. In this period, it was understood that the jizya tax taken from the mawalf, was caused by the unlawful practices of some regional governors, most of them were non-Muslim local tax officials and all their purpose was to collect the amount of combined jizya. It cannot be said that the Umayyad caliphs officially ordered written instructions in order to take the conceptual sense from the ma wailpart. But some Khorasan governors, who detected that taxes were decreasing, blinked at the collection of the jizya from the ma wail. Summary: The tax policies of a state are of great importance for the political, social, and economic stability. A regular tax system minimizes the problems that the state mechanism might face. The establishment of a fair and just tax scheme is undoubtedly possible with a deeprooted state experience. It is known that the Umayyad state which is the subject of this research has no state experience. Furthermore, ruling to the area which is on 13 million square kilometers and reaching to Kashgar in the East and to South France in the West and governing this multinational structure who are living on these regions, put the Umayyad government in a very difficult condition. With the vast borders and the stoppage of the conquests, some political, social and economic problems were experienced and these problems deeply affected the government. The groups which had argued with Shiites and Kharijites because of some various reasons led the country into collapsing. It is also known that many plague epidemics in the region of Damascus affected the society in a negative way, changing the capital and changing some of the border cities in favor of the Eastern Roman Empire. All these negativities certainly shaken the Umayyad state economically. It is understood from the data that the instability and political uncertainties in the country led to a decrease in the tax rates. For example, the Umayyad caliph `Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan period, only half of the tax was collected at the time of Hazrat `Umar could be collected. It can be said that the public who avoided the general policies of the state avoided giving tax, in other words, the tax evasion. Also, the increasing migration from village to city and due to that, the vacancy of tribute tax collected land, failure to obtain expected yield because of rent fights on fertile lands, and conversion process in non-Muslim community are included in other reasons of reduction of taxes. In the Umayyad period, the issue of taking the jizya from the ma walfcan be considered in this context. We do not have an independent work or research article on how this practice was initiated, how it was and how it was taken from mawalf, and how it was a state policy, and how long it was sustained. The studies that touch on this subject are far from being holistic. Even in the main sources it is seen that the concepts of kharaj and jizya are not fully understood and therefore used interchangeably. This may be considered normal for the first period in which the concepts are not in place. However, in the following centuries, the works that were copyrighted and, except for a few, instead of understanding and explaining this confusion, chose to use the word jizya from these two words which can be used interchangeably in texts. Therefore, this approach has led to the widespread conviction that the Umayyad state has taken jizya from the ma wailin the conceptual sense. Al-Hajjaj ibn Ytiisuf is claimed to have started the application of taken jizya from mawalf. However, Haccac aimed to provide the regularity of both agricultural products and the kharaj which is taken from farmers because of the status of the soil by sending Sawad villagers who migrated to the big cities and became Muslims by changing their religions. The status of the lands seized was decisive in taxation. According to this, the conquest and the territorial lands were taxed differently, but in some cases the same tax (kharaj) was taken. Non-Muslims who living in the territory of conquest were demanded jizya per capita. The jizya and kharajtax collected from this category can be expressed as joint jizya. Regardless of whether the person is a Muslim or not, the fact that he was demanded from him due to the status of the land was interpreted by some researchers as juristic. However, in times of political instability, it is also a fact that mawalfis demanding jury in addition to the tribute tax. The point that is misunderstood or interpreted is that this practice was carried out throughout the entire Umayyad territory and the history. When examined, this distorted tax concept is actually concentrated in the area of Transoxania. Although some attempts were made to take the jizya from the mawalfto the country, the Umayyad caliphs have not allowed it. The practice of taking the jizya from the ma walfis actually followed by the killing Qutayba ibn Muslim al-Bahill (d. 96/715). This started political instability in the Transoxania and continued by some Khurasan governors. These governors act according to the provocations of the Turkish governors and tax collectors of the region in order to be able to send their taxes completely. They claimed that the region in the region was not a sincere Muslim and, they continued to take the jizya from them. It can be said that jizya is not demanded as it is taken from non-Muslims in the common meaning from ma wail. Because any Umayyad caliph wrote no written instructions regarding this issue in the sources. It is understood that until the caliphate of `Umar b. `Abd al2Aziz, the Umayyad caliphs were not even aware of this distorted tax policy in the area of Transoxania. To put it once again, this practice was initiated by some Khurasan governors with the concern that tax revenues might decrease. However, it should not be forgotten that this unfair practice after 96/715 is limited to certain governors. For example, during the tenure of Nasr b. Seyyar, the last governor of Khurasan (120-131 / 738-748), the jizya tax was completely removed from the mawali. Another activity that shows this action is regional and that was ordered by some governors of Khurasan. Therefore, this practice does not reflect the Umayyad state policy. This is also apparent in the fact that the Shiites, Kharijites, and those who carried out the Abbasid Revolution for thirty-two years, did not make an anti-Umayyad propaganda with provoking the slave by the way of wrong application.Öğe The Autonomy Established by Ahmad ibn Tulun in Egypt and His Allegiance to the Abbasids (254-270/868-884)(Dinbilimleri Akad Arastirma Merkezi, 2025) Akyurek, YunusThis study examines the increasing influence of the Turkish element in the military and bureaucratic spheres during the Samarra' period (221-279/836-892) of the Abbasid Caliphate. In this context, it focuses on the life, governorship, and relations with the caliphal center of Abu al-Abbas Ahmad ibn Tulun al-Turki (d. 270/884), who served as governor of Egypt. The subject of the article is the rising political and military authority of Ahmad ibn Tulun, one of the prominent Turkish commanders of the Samarra' era. The analysis of his tenure in Egypt-a region of strategic and economic significance-is critical for understanding the broader role of Turkish commanders in `Abbasid politics. The study investigates whether Ahmad ibn Tulun engaged in a confrontation with the caliphal authority and whether he aimed to establish an independent state. It seeks to answer the following research questions: What factors shaped Ahmad's political and military decisions? Which individuals or events prompted him to adopt an oppositional stance? What were the nature and dynamics of his relations with the `Abbasid caliphs? Why did he attempt to seize control of the Levant (al-Sham)? What were the underlying causes of his conflict with the caliphal regent al-Muwaffaq? Why did he ultimately fail in his struggle with the central authority? What position did he take regarding the establishment of an autonomous Turkish polity? The scope of the study is confined to Ahmad ibn Tulun's life before he was appointed governor, his designation as governor of Egypt, his relations with Caliph al-Mu`tamid (r. 256-279/870-892), and especially his conflict with the caliphal regent al-Muwaffaq. The central thesis of the article posits that Ahmad ibn Tulun did not rebel directly against the caliphate, accepted the legitimacy of the caliph, and did not seek to found a fully independent state in the conceptual sense. The usage of the term Tulunid State (al-Dawla al-Tuluniyya) in some sources is argued to be insufficient to denote complete independence. The conflict between Ahmad and al-Muwaffaq, who functioned as a de facto ruler due to his success in suppressing the Zanj Rebellion and controlling state affairs, forms the crux of the article. Ahmad's efforts to improve Egypt's economic and administrative structure and his attainment of practical autonomy by 259/873 caused alarm for al-Muwaffaq, who attempted to dismiss him-albeit unsuccessfully. Subsequently, Ahmad directly confronted al-Muwaffaq, a development attributed by the study to the latter's increasing pressure and provocations. Ahmad's occupation of the Levant (264-265/877-878) is interpreted as a measure to ensure the security of Egypt. His attempt to gain control over Tarsus is deemed strategic but ultimately unsuccessful. Tensions peaked in 269/882 when Caliph al-Mu`tamid secretly appealed to Ahmad against al-Muwaffaq and attempted to flee to Egypt, only to be stopped by a governor loyal to al-Muwaffaq. In response, Ahmad prohibited the mention of al-Muwaffaq's name in the Friday khutbas, while al-Muwaffaq coerced the caliph into anathematizing Ahmad and stripping him of all official powers. Ahmad countered by rallying support among various factions under his control and formally declared the removal of al-Muwaffaq from the succession. However, he failed to secure widespread backing, as segments of the bureaucracy, military, religious scholars, and the populace gradually turned against him. His final attempt to assert authority by seizing Mecca also failed, and he encountered resistance in the Levant. Ultimately, he fell ill in Antioch and died in Egypt in 270/884. The study emphasizes that Ahmad's continued mention of the 'Abbasid caliph's name on minted coins and in khutbas is a significant indication of his allegiance to the caliphate. Considering the period he lived in, his educational background, and demonstrated loyalty, the claim that he declared complete independence is refuted. It concludes that the primary source of Ahmad's opposition was al-Muwaffaq, who feared that a robust and autonomous governor in a vital province such as Egypt could precipitate future disintegration. Thus, Ahmad's oppositional stance is primarily seen as a reaction to al-Muwaffaq's pressure and incitement. The quasi-autonomous governance established by Ahmad is interpreted not as a formal rebellion, but as a de facto emirate that developed in defiance of al-Muwaffaq's authority. In summary, the political formation established by Ahmed in Egypt can be described as a de facto autonomy, achieved by a powerful governor who succeeded in obtaining autonomy in the region, and whose relations with the central authority varied depending on time and circumstances, despite the will of the Deputy of the Caliph, al-Muwaffaq, who was the true representative of the caliphal institution.Öğe The Variable Jizya Policy of Ashras b. Abdullah, Governor of Khorasan, Towards the Mawâl?(Afyon Kocatepe Univ, 2025) Akyurek, YunusThis study explores the shifting stance of Ashras b. Abdullah, the Umayyad governor of Khorasan (109-111/727-729), towards the collection of jizya from the maw & amacr;l & imacr;. The aim is to contribute to the understanding of the issue of jizya collection from the maw & acirc;l & imacr; during the Umayyad period through an analysis of Ashras' policies. Upon assuming office, Ashras announced the abolition of this tax for the maw & acirc;l & imacr;. However, due to an unexpected surge in conversions to Islam and the potential revenue losses, he quickly reverted to the previous governors' practice of conditional jizya collection. Several factors influenced this inconsistent policy shift, including the persuasion of non-Muslim tax officials, local leaders (marz & ucirc;b & acirc;ns and dihq & acirc;ns), and perhaps most notably, Caliph Hisham b. Abd al-Malik's (105-125/724-743) financial sensitivities. This fluctuating taxation policy led some maw & acirc;l & imacr; to migrate from Samarqand (Sogd), with certain Arab elites offering them practical support. Ashras, refusing to backtrack, sought to suppress the maw & acirc;l & imacr; and their supporters through various pressure mechanisms, which, coupled with military support from Turkic forces north of the Seyhun River, escalated into a regional rebellion. Consequently, much of the Sogdian territories slipped from Umayyad control, and Ashras, deemed unsuccessful, was eventually dismissed. The research is confined to Ashras' variable jizya policies and their outcomes, though it also includes contextual information about the conditions under which this practice emerged and its cessation. The study demonstrates that jizya was not uniformly demanded from all maw & acirc;l & imacr; during the Umayyad period. This practice was initiated in Sogd after the death of Khorasan Governor Qutayba b. Muslim (d. 96/715). However, some caliphs and governors refrained from imposing such a tax, while others implemented it under specific conditions. It is also evident that although Caliph Hisham did not request the collection of jizya from the maw & amacr;l & imacr; in its technical sense either in writing or verbally, he nevertheless left the final decision on this matter to the discretion of Khorasan's governors. The study employs the narrative research technique, one of the qualitative research methods, as its primary methodology.











